SSPX, the ordinary Magisterium, obsequium religiosum, and legitimate dissent

Some time ago I criticized the attitude of the SSPX toward the Magisterium. I wish now to renew that criticism and--while I'm not privy to the discussions that have been taking place--to suggest what might be the impasse on the part of the Holy Father.

Today the SSPX General Chapter released a statement concerning the reconciliation. A couple key lines:

The Society continues to uphold the declarations and the teachings of the constant Magisterium of the Church in regard to all the novelties of the Second Vatican Council which remain tainted with errors . . .

. . . while waiting for the day when an open and serious debate will be possible which may allow the return to Tradition of the ecclesiastical authorities.

This strikes me as seriously concerning. First it clearly implies (here as elsewhere) that the institutional Church has abandoned Tradition (note the capital 'T'). If literally taken this amounts to charging the "ecclesiastical authorities"--presumably including the Pope himself--with apostasy.

But let's pass to something more concrete. The accusation that the "novelties of the Second Vatican Council remain tainted with errors."

Let's take as given that the Second Vatican council never invoked infallibility and defined some point of faith. This would mean that the statements of Vat. II are very authoritative Magisterial statements--albeit reformable, except insofar as they reiterate what was previously defined. So let us look at what then Joes. Card. Ratsinger (acting as prefect of the CDF) had to say about such statements, particularly let us consider the CDF commentary on the Professio fidei and Donum veritatis.


Having taken as given that Vat. II does not promulgate any binding definitions, we can ignore the treatment that irreformable teachings receive in these two documents, and focus on the assent that is owed to statements of the ordinary magisterium. These require religious submission of intellect and will, the famous obsequium religiosum. The Commentary on the Professio fidei, no. 10, reads: "Such teachings are, however, an authentic expression of the ordinary Magisterium of the Roman Pontiff or of the College of Bishops and therefore require religious submission of will and intellect."



Likewise we read in DV no. 23:

When the Magisterium, not intending to act "definitively", teaches a doctrine to aid a better understanding of Revelation and make explicit its contents, or to recall how some teaching is in conformity with the truths of faith, or finally to guard against ideas that are incompatible with these truths, the response called for is that of the religious submission of will and intellect. This kind of response cannot be simply exterior or disciplinary but must be understood within the logic of faith and under the impulse of obedience to the faith.
The willingness to submit loyally to the teaching of the Magisterium on matters per se not irreformable must be the rule.

The reason for this religious submission--even on matters not per se irreformable--is found in Donum veritatis no. 17, which reads in part:

Divine assistance is also given to the successors of the apostles teaching in communion with the successor of Peter, and in a particular way, to the Roman Pontiff as Pastor of the whole Church, when exercising their ordinary Magisterium, even should this not issue in an infallible definition or in a "definitive" pronouncement but in the proposal of some teaching which leads to a better understanding of Revelation in matters of faith and morals and to moral directives derived from such teaching.

 Cf. Lumen gentium no. 25, although the idea--if not the expression--was present earlier. I cite Pius XII, Humani generis no. 20:

Nor must it be thought that what is expounded in Encyclical Letters does not of itself demand consent, since in writing such Letters the Popes do not exercise the supreme power of their Teaching Authority. For these matters are taught with the ordinary teaching authority, of which it is true to say: "He who heareth you, heareth me"; and generally what is expounded and inculcated in Encyclical Letters already for other reasons appertains to Catholic doctrine. But if the Supreme Pontiffs in their official documents purposely pass judgment on a matter up to that time under dispute, it is obvious that that matter, according to the mind and will of the Pontiffs, cannot be any longer considered a question open to [free] discussion among theologians.

(I insert the word 'free' because it changes the meaning and appears in the Latin.)

The point of this passage is this: When the ordinary Magisterium makes its mind known on some issue, without making a definitive act, discussion of the point can continue, but that discussion is not entirely free. Rather the discussion must take place within certain confines and limits.

The commentary on the Professio fidei (no. 11) makes clear that such statements and the submission owed them admit of degrees:

. . .one can point in general to teachings set forth by the authentic ordinary Magisterium in a non-definitive way, which require degrees of adherence differentiated according to the mind and the will manifested; this is shown especially by the nature of the documents, by the frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or by the tenor of the verbal expression.

Hence an off-the-cuff comment from a single bishop needn't be treated with quite the same deference as an entire section in a Papal encyclical. I would suggest that the formally promulgated teaching of a general council of the Church constitutes the highest level of this reformable magisterial teaching.

Donum veritatis lays out norms of dissent from such teaching, the limits that were implied in Humani generis:

Passing over no. 29, in no. 30 we read that he should approach the Magisterium with his difficulties, with a genuine hope for resolution,

If, despite a loyal effort on the theologian's part, the difficulties persist, the theologian has the duty to make known to the Magisterial authorities the problems raised by the teaching in itself, in the arguments proposed to justify it, or even in the manner in which it is presented. He should do this in an evangelical spirit and with a profound desire to resolve the difficulties.

That is, in his dissent the theologian must desire a genuine resolution. I submit that such a profound desire is not a line-in-the-sand, my-way-or-the-highway attitude. This reading is vindicated when we encounter (still no. 30) the bombshell:

In cases like these [in which he has been unable to resolve his difficulty with some teaching], the theologian should avoid turning to the "mass media", but have recourse to the responsible authority, for it is not by seeking to exert the pressure of public opinion that one contributes to the clarification of doctrinal issues and renders service to the truth.

One should not take his trouble to the media; he should not try to direct public pressure on the Magisterium. What is this public statement from the General Chapter of the SSPX if not just such an attempt to take one's problems to the public and exert pressure on the Magisterium?


Finally, faced with a proposition to which he simply cannot give consent, he is admonished that (DV, no. 31) ". . . the theologian nevertheless has the duty to remain open to a deeper examination of the question." We must never completely shut the door on the teaching's being vindicated. We must always allow the possibility that some resolution might possible which we simply have not yet considered; thus we must resist rejecting absolutely the teaching. Does the absolute statement of the SSPX concerning the errors of Vat. II demonstrate an openness to a "deeper examination of the question?"

In short: You don't need to give absolute assent to non-definitive teachings of the Magisterium. Such teachings are after all reformable, and we are not asked to blindly and unconditionally assent to what is in principle able to be corrected. But we are required to maintain both an internal and external submissiveness to the teaching of the Church.

Interiorly this means we are always to be docile, open to being taught. We are to remain open to a vindication of the troublesome teaching, especially to the possibility that we have misunderstood it. Briefly put, we are not to pass an absolute judgement on such teachings thereby closing the door to a reconciliation of the teaching to what we hold to be certain.

Exteriorly this means that we are not to propose our dissenting opinion to others as absolute and established fact, but we must qualify our dissenting opinion as our opinion, an opinion which is always open to correction. Neither are we to try to exert public pressure on the Magisterium.

I suggest that the recent statement of the SSPX violates both of these norms. They have unqualifiedly labeled a general council of the Church as teaching errors, and have made this dissent public, precisely with the objective of exerting pressure on the Church.

To anyone from the SSPX connected to these talks, I can only ask that you reevaluate the role of the members of the Church to the Magisterium. The Church does not ask you to unreservedly assent to these teachings. But she does ask that you remain respectful of her divinely granted and divinely guarded teaching office. You may ultimately dissent. But you must do so within the "logic of faith," a logic founded on Christ's promise to safeguard his Church.

Some Fallout from the Vatican's crackdown on dissident nuns

For those who haven't yet heard the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith recently cracked down on the Leadership Conference for Women Religious. The CDF document can be found here.

In response to this, the PBS Newhour did an interview with Donna Bethell (defending the CDF, Chairman of the Board of Directors at Christendom Colelge) and Jennine Hill Fletcher (defending the nuns, self-styled Feminist Theologian, professor of Theology at Fordham).

In the brief segment, Miss Fletcher takes the last word. Here it is:

Let me just say, as a scholar -- as a scholar of religion and a theologian, church teaching does change.
And I think that's one of the fundamental issues here, especially around the issue of LGBTQ persons and homosexuality. I think that the issue -- one of the issues is the church teaching we have seen in -- from the second to the 16th century, church teaching was no salvation outside the church.
At Vatican II, in the 20th century, there's a very different understanding of the relationship of the Catholic truth and the Catholic faith to the truths and faiths of people of the world. And so to suggest that there are some things that simply will not change, I'm not sure that that's been the tradition of the Catholic Church.

I'm not going to let Miss Fletcher have the last word on this.

First, it is well acknowledge that Church teaching changes, at least for some values of "change" and "Church teaching."

First, no one disputes that there is a development of doctrine. This is a well established principle that every theologian knows. Through this development the Church comes to more fully articulate what is contain in revelation. My favorite example is the two fundamental mysteries of the faith, the Trinity and Incarnation. On the one hand they are certainly present in Scripture, on the other it was only after centuries that the Church came to what we would consider a clear formulation of precisely how we are to understand what Scripture is telling us and what further that implies, e.g., the very word "Trinity" or the formulas "three Persons, and one Substance" and "one Person, two natures".

Second, there are other church teachings which can in principle be changed. That is why Theologians make a study of the levels of authority, and try to clearly distinguish reformable from irreformable teaching.

Any remotely competent theologian is aware of these basic ideas  because it defines the legitimate scope of the theologian's work. But these principles, acknowledging as they do some respects in which Church teaching can change, do not by any means imply that Catholic theology is a free-for-all.

She mentioned two topics on which the Church has changed her teaching: LGBTQ persons and homosexuality (without ellaboration) and extra ecclesiam nulla salus (citing in particular Lumen Gentium).

As to the first, I'm not sure what change in teaching the eminent theologian refers to, but here are a couple relevant and recent statements.

Catechism of the Catholic Church number 2357:

Homosexuality refers to relations between men or between women who experience an exclusive or predominant sexual attraction toward persons of the same sex. . . . Basing itself on Sacred Scripture, which presents homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity,tradition has always declared that "homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered."They are contrary to the natural law. They close the sexual act to the gift of life. They do not proceed from a genuine affective and sexual complementarity. Under no circumstances can they be approved.

And the Congregation for Catholic Education's 2005 Instruction on the criteria of discernment of vocations for those with homosexual tendencies:

Regarding [homosexual] acts, it teaches that, in Sacred Scripture, these are presented as grave sins. Tradition has constantly considered them to be intrinsically immoral and contrary to natural law. These, consequently, may not be approved in any case.
Concerning profoundly deep-rooted homosexual tendencies, that one discovers in a certain number of men and women, these are also objectively disordered and often constitute a trial, even for these men and women.

Again, she didn't make clear what precise change she alludes to, but the major teaching seems to have remained quite stable. And as a Theologian, I have no bloody idea what alleged change she is referring to on this front. In fact, this teaching is one of the teachings that the left gives the Church the most flack for not changing.

As to the claim that Lumen Gentium rejects the teaching of extra ecclesiam nulla salus, I quote from the same document, number 14:

Basing itself upon Sacred Scripture and Tradition, it teaches that the Church, now sojourning on earth as an exile, is necessary for salvation. Christ, present to us in His Body, which is the Church, is the one Mediator and the unique way of salvation. In explicit terms He Himself affirmed the necessity of faith and baptism and thereby affirmed also the necessity of the Church, for through baptism as through a door men enter the Church.

(While I hate to get sidetracked I feel bound to make mention of the fact that, despite a long and formidable history of teaching extra ecclesiam nulla salus, the Catholic Church has always acknowledge baptism of desire and baptism of blood, both of which constitute ways that a person can, etraordinarily, be incorporated into the Body of Christ without formal, public entrance into the institutional Church.)

Miss Fletcher seems to be embracing the "hermeneutic of discontinuity" decried by HH Benedict XVI in his Christmas address to the Roman Curia in 2005:

On the one hand, there is an interpretation that I would call "a hermeneutic of discontinuity and rupture"; it has frequently availed itself of the sympathies of the mass media, and also one trend of modern theology. On the other, there is the "hermeneutic of reform", of renewal in the continuity of the one subject-Church which the Lord has given to us. She is a subject which increases in time and develops, yet always remaining the same, the one subject of the journeying People of God.
The hermeneutic of discontinuity risks ending in a split between the pre-conciliar Church and the post-conciliar Church.

Now fun fun fun, along comes the National "Catholic" Reporter ('Catholic' in quotes because they use the name in defiance of canon 216), with a host of ad mulierem attacks and non-sequiturs.

Bethell spent her airtime discrediting women religious for not presenting the "full doctrine of the church" and not helping members "to understand it and to live it." But a web search of Ms. Bethell quickly reveals that some of her most deeply held convictions conflict significantly with Roman Catholic doctrine.

They go on to outline "three significant conflicts" between Mrs. Betthell and her husband and the Catholic Church. Namely: battling climate change, nuclear disarmament and evolution.

One by one shall we proceed:

"Battling climate change"--First, there is nothing dogmatic about climate change. The hypothesis of man-made climate change falls decidedly in the realm of science, and outside the ken of revelation.The Church may give practical advice based on her judgement of the scientific facts combined with her moral teaching, but such advice is entirely prudential, and as such is not a matter of supreme magisterial authority.
Second, it must be pointed out that the offensive opinion is publicly held by Mrs. Bethell's husband. In other words this is guilt by association.

"Nuclear disarmament"--This objection is unique in that it actually attaches to Mrs. Bethell. But the problem is again, that this does not seem to be a matter of Church dogma. While the Church lays out principles of just  prosecution of war (for example decrying "total war"), she has never bound the faithful to reject the holding of nuclear arms.

"Evolution"--First this has nothing to do with Mrs. Bethell. Unless the NCR wishes to affirm that women in public life are morally one with their husbands and responsible for their husbands' acts, this is irrelevant, and again an allegation of guilt by association. Second, and more to the point, nothing in Church teaches says that holding evolution is a matter of the Catholic faith. The Church respects on this issue the legitimate inquiry of science, and although she allows the study of evolution, and even though the last couple popes have appeared to espouse it, the Church has never imposed it on the Church as a matter of the faith. Nor I would argue could they. Again, I find the claim that questioning evolution contradicts the Magisterium, when the Church is frequently ridiculed by the secularists for not more vigorously embracing evolution, simply laughable.

Of the three objectionable opinions that The NCR associates with Mrs. Bethell, none actually pertains to irreformable Chruch teaching. Mrs. Bethell herself pointed out that on many issues (especially moral issues that involve prudence) there is a diversity of oppinions accepatable within the Catholic Church:

There are doctrines in the church which are not open for debate. Everybody knows that. If that weren't the case, there wouldn't be a Catholic Church. And there are things that are open for debate, for discussion about how you apply this principle. There's lots of room for prudential judgment, especially in the area of social justice, but there are things that are not open for debate.

She was merely echoing Card. Ratzinger and the CDF:

Not all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and euthanasia. For example, if a Catholic were to be at odds with the Holy Father on the application of capital punishment or on the decision to wage war, he would not for that reason be considered unworthy to present himself to receive Holy Communion. While the Church exhorts civil authorities to seek peace, not war, and to exercise discretion and mercy in imposing punishment on criminals, it may still be permissible to take up arms to repel an aggressor or to have recourse to capital punishment. There may be a legitimate diversity of opinion even among Catholics about waging war and applying the death penalty, but not however with regard to abortion and euthanasia.

Further of these three, only one of them is based on something Mrs. Bethell herself actually has done. Two of the three are things that her husband has done.

Hence NCR's closing line--

The Vatican's double standard on dissent is breathtaking.

--is breathtakingly stupid. The Vatican's standard is perfectly consistent.

Hence, the line in this debate is not solely between liberal and conservative, but between correct theology and bad theology, between theology that knows what the proper job of theology is, and what it is not, a thing that neither of the two opponents to Mrs. Bethell seem to understand.

Rewriting history

I recently discovered this little piece of trash, after discovering http://www.saylor.org, a project aimed at creating material for full university education available online and free for distribution.

The piece of trash I refer to is the text of a lecture entitled "Heresies, heretics, and the Church" made public by Stephen Kreis, Professor of History at American Public University.

He starts off quite fairly giving both Gratian and Thomas Aquinas's definitions of 'heresy'. (For those unfamiliar, heresy is, in essence, a willful and obstinate rejection of a dogma by a Catholic.)

First we get a false etymology:

Heresy (from the Latin, secte) meant treason to God,

This is just wrong: English 'heresy' is from Latin, 'haeresis' (via Old French) which was just a transliteration of Greek 'hairesis' derived from the Gk. verb 'haerein', literally "to choose". See a discussion of it here and the basic etymology here. The mediaevals developed this into the idea that a heretic is a Catholic who picks and chooses what he will believe rather than accepting the faith as it is handed down to him.

I just need to take a moment here to point out the utter stupidity of his folk etymology. A quick google search does not turn up any testimony to an alternative etymology of 'haeresis' from 'secte'. Not only is the etymology I give the one that one will find in dictionaries, it is bloody obvious as anyone who looks at it will quickly see. How one would derive 'heresy' from 'secte' is not at all clear (although it must be admitted that the Greek noun 'hairesis' was sometimes translated to Latin as 'secte', but this is by no means an etymology of either the English or Latin words).

I should point out that there is an English work that comes from Latin 'secte', not 'heresy' but 'sect'.

Then we are treated to this non-sequitur:

Women became heretics because they were denied entrance into the clergy.

I'm honestly not entirely sure what the meaning of the preceding sentence is. The only half-plausible meaning I can find is that he means by "heretics" something like second-class citizens. I suppose rewriting history is a lot easier when you get to make up the meanings of the words. Let me try: All history professors are queer (Did I mention that by 'queer' I mean someone who has read at least 5, unillustrated books?). Actually, I should recast my assertion, Dr. Kreis may in fact be the only straight history professor who has ever lived.

For the moment I will ignore the fact that he indirectly describes the Cathars as placing an "emphesis on chastity . . . and moral purity". I will also ignore his wandering into areas he has no buisness in, where he makes cheap shots at the Church, e.g., "What [the heretics] were rejecting was the way the Church hierarchy had interpreted and manipulated Christian dogma."

The piece that shows just how desperate he is to tear down the Church comes when he treats the Dominicans and Franciscans:

The Church sends out Dominic to convert heretics back to Rome. Instead, Dominic created the Dominicans, in essence, a rival sect. Although the Dominicans were not heretics, they were serving a role that ought to have been served by the Church itself. What this tells me, and what it must have told 13th century men and women, was that the Church was just not doing its job.

Hold everything. How is the Dominican Order "in essence, a rival sect?" Is there anything from the pope or from the Dominicans suggesting that either side considered itself a rival to the other? Were the Dominicans not more directly united to the Pope than any Benedictine monastery? Did they not continuously maintain papal authority and teach in accordance with the Pope and councils? What possible foundation is there for labeling the Dominicans a "rival sect?"

Similarly the Franciscans:

St. Francis, like Dominic, was no heretic. But, and here is the irony, the strength of his movement is that people were appealing to his order and not the Church, for spiritual guidance. All this clearly shows that first, the Church was clearly losing ground in providing its flock with necessary spirituality.

Were not the Franciscans part of the Church? How can one call an appeal to the Franciscans anything but an appeal to the Church? Where is this "church" that the Franciscans were cannibalizing?

I must conclude that this particular professor of history is utterly ignorant of both the middle ages and the Church, and that he has no business talking about either one as a layman, let alone as a professional historian.

But then again the evidence of his want of education was scattered all over the text in his consistent use of the singular "they" (the surest mark of pandering, illiterate vulgarity), as well as in such peculiarities as an inability to form a comparative sentence: ". . . heretical groups from Milan preferred burning at the stake than recant their beliefs." Please. Aside from a handful of exceptional cases, 'than ' demands two conjuncts in parallel grammatical form; No mixing of gerunds and infinitives. Not even a schoolboy would write a sentence so offensive to the ear.

Sophism on personhood

While browsing Google News, the following headline caught my eye: "State's 'personhood' initiative at odds with science." It was penned by a certain Arthur Caplan, Ph.D., director of the Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania.

I was intrigued by what salient facts he might bring forward to decided the admittedly difficult philosophical issue. I was sorely disappointed and instead of finding fascinating facts found only blatant fallacies, more accurately one blatant fallacy developed into an article.

It seems to me the whole article can be summed up in one quotation:

What science has found is that around half of all conceptions don't make it to implantation. Calling a fertilized egg a person flies in the face of this cruel biological reality. Half of all fertilized eggs cannot even become an embryo, much less a person.

See what he did? He assumes his own private definition of 'person'--he never says what he means by 'person'--and simply postulates without any defense that an embryo is not yet one and that since most embryos do not develop into one (whatever is required to be a person according to Dr. Caplan) it is wrong to call embryos persons. How such terrible logic got passed into a published article baffles me.

This is a textbook example of circular logic and just says, Most embryos will never become persons, therefore embryos are not persons. But there was no attempt to establish the principle which itself contains what the author is trying to prove. I believe we call this technically a petitio principii.

How does a person capable of writing such utter tripe get a doctorate, let alone a job teaching Bioethics at an Ivy?

Christianity and homosexuality

Just a quick reply to a tasty tidbit I dug up in a forum thread discussing social conservatives at Yale. Since this is not the first time I have encountered these ideas I thought it might be a chance to address them:

Social conservatism is grounded for me personally in biblical principles, because it is an extension of my religious faith. The entire conception of anti-gay conservatism is really flawed, the Christian faith is about embracing people regardless of differences. Do we disagree about a lifestyle of homosexuality? Yep. But the people are the ones that matter not what they do.

No. Just no. This line refuses to die and we have to make a point of calling people out on it:

Mt 10: [34] Do not think that I came to send peace upon earth: I came not to send peace, but the sword. [35] For I came to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law against her mother in law.

Obviously the reason Christ came was not to bring war, but that is the effect of His Gospel: Those who reject it will hate those who accept and spread it (and those who accept it must not compromise for the sake of political correctness: " [37] He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me").

This is the patent meaning of the whole passage.

Again, did Christ embrace the money changers regardless of the personal differences He had with them?

Truth is divisive. Charity, yes. But charity in truth. You can't deny the truth to avoid giving Pharisaical scandal.

I find this conception of so called "intolerance" does not spill over to the other sins like lying or stealing or cheating on a spouse. Even if you disagree, social conservatism is from the viewpoint that all our actions are choices and that choice is the bad thing, not the person.

Yes of course, we love the sinner and hate the sin. But the logic is a mess as it is here being applied. You must recognize that people's choices have enduring consequences that will attach to the one who makes the choice.
Let me descend to an illustration:
How do you apply this dichotomy of choice and person to a cold-blooded murderer? Sure we love him, pray for his conversion, treat him like a human, and so on. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't discriminate against murderers by say, oh I don't know, outlawing murder.

Also, I should note that I do discriminate against those who lie, steal, and cheat on their spouses, at least if it is clear that the acts in question weren't the result of occasional weaknesses but of deliberate, unrepentant, long-term self-determination, a self-determination that is daily renewed.

Lying is a sin, and I do not lie and am firmly against it. But would I protest liars? No. That would not make any sense, similarly why would I protest gay groups? That would actually be counter-productive to spreading the message of CHRIST.

This is just too dumb to pass on. Let's think about this a minute: The reason we don't protest liars is that liars do not identify themselves as such. When was the last time you encountered a militant liars' organization? The whole idea of liars self-identifying is ridiculous--liars don't want to be known as liars because, not only does no one like a liar (i.e., the entire world universally discriminates against liars), but more importantly no one believes a liar and the whole damned point of lying is to be believed.
However, I'd be willing to bet that if this author ever met an inveterate liar he'd discriminate against him just the like the rest of the world.

I think some people on here may have skewed conceptions of Christian principles and should read what CHRIST said and not what people do.

Back attcha, those lines from Matthew were what Christ said.

Gender roles

I've been indulging my morbid curiosity and reading John McNeil's blog; He was a Jesuit who was removed from the Society because of his outspoken views on homosexual relations, which are mainly what he writes about on his blog.

I've noticed that his writings vacillate between the laughably misguided (Didn't you know the centurion's servant was actually his gay lover? Or that Martha, Mary, and Lazarus were an LGBT "family"?) and profoundly insightful.

Case in point, his post on "how gay marriage will save straight marriage!" [yes, re: the exclamation point, sic. Italics mine]:

Another major problem with heterosexual marriage is that it is based on gender-identity images. . . . They result in seeing the human individual, whether male or female, as essentially partial and incomplete. No human person is seen as complete in him or her-self, but as essentially dependent on the opposite sex for her or his completion. The male is required to suppress all the feminine in himself and seek the feminine outside himself in a woman. Women, in turn, must suppress all the masculine in themselves and seek the masculine outside themselves in the male.

It is this shift in consciousness that has caused the enormous amount of breakdown and divorce when heterosexuals try to follow the traditional patterns of male dominance and feminine submission. Both genders are being called on to develop the fullness of their own humanity, so that they can approach each other as complete, independent persons and not remain essentially dependent on the other gender for their completion.

Now he tries to take this whole gender roles theme and turn it into inequality, self-suppression and misogyny, hence destructive of any true love; But at the end of the day, ignoring all the commentary, he seems to be doing a pretty good job describing the complementarity of the two genders, and recognizing that this complementarity is at the heart of traditional marriage.

The problem--of course--is that he rejects this complementarity (he'd rather we all be more or less androgynous, transcending sex). To his rejection I can only ask, It is really bad when a man feels like half a person without his wife? Does that feeling really render true love impossible? Is the family more stable and more relevant when the two people are utterly independent and self-satisfied, having no need for one another?

Back the the original point: Leave it to a gay man to get (albeit in a very gay way) heterosexuality.

Concerning the Anglican Church of Virginia's reply to the Pope

Context:

Here is the website of the Anglican Church of Virginia.

And here is the letter, (by Larry Johnson) prominently on their front page, to which I am replying.

The fundamental point is made in the second paragraph:

I said before this is sheep stealing

What precisely is the difference between "sheep stealing" and evangelization? What I mean by this is simply that the Anglican and Catholic Churches have between themselves substantial differences of doctrine and practice. Let's hypothesize for a moment that the Pope is actually Catholic, that is, that he in fact accepts the Catholic Church's claim to being the Church established by Christ for the salvation of men. Let's say also that the Pope is not an Anglican, and so reject's any sort of branch theory that would legitimize the Anglican Church. Can one then fault him for wishing Anglicans to come to the Catholic Church, which ex hypothesi he believes to be the true Church? Can one fault him for wishing these souls to have at their disposal the graces whereof the Catholic Church believes herself to be the dispenser or to know the fullness of the Gospel whereof the Catholic Church professes herself to be the sole guardian?

What I'm getting at is this: Although I can certainly see an Anglican disagreeing with the Church's claims on these points (after all such a person is an Anglican, presumably for a reason) I cannot see how one can hold the Pope in bad faith for trying to make the way of salvation easier and more certain for Anglicans (which after all, given that he is a Catholic, is precisely what he understands himself to be doing). One can sympathize with an Anglican's objecting to the Pope's objective claims, but I have difficulty seeing how an Anglican can in good faith label him as subjectively blame-worthy for doing what given his own religion is an act of charity. Unless of course we are relativists and think that there is in fact no true Church, or that no particular religion has any particular claim to truth.

and is an attempt to further fracture an already fractured method of faith.

I'm not sure what "an already fractured method of faith" is meant to refer to. If to the Anglican Church, then as already discussed the Pope has no particular interest in its continuation as such. The Pope's job is not to safeguard the Church of England. If on the other hand it refers to the Catholic Church, the Church has never had a problem with liturgical or devotional diversity. In fact she is rather tolerant of them. If it refers to Christianity generally, then the mind boggles to try to understand how working to reunify Christians who were once one and have since broken apart is "further fracturing", rather than reintegration and unification into a single catholic--i.e., universal--church.

It is Rome once again declaring war on Anglicanism.

Let us for a moment recall the history of the Anglican Church. Who was it that usurped the other's--'till then--undisputed claim to being head of the Church in England? Who dissolved the monasteries and confiscated the Church's property (which hurt not only the Church but the poor who lived off the monestaries' lands) and then enacted a brutal persecution of Catholics whose crime was simply continuing to practice the Faith that the English had professed for centuries?

I don't want this to be taken as a low-blow: I'm simply pointing out that if the author wants to talk about "Rome once again declaring war on Anglicanism" he might like to recall who committed the acts of war that started it in the first place.

As to the Pope's recent invitation being taken as a declaration of war, I hardly think he would call it that, but as I already pointed out: Necessarily the relation between Catholics and Anglicans will have a fundamental tension. There is always going to be the elephant in the room that we can't both be right. And if Catholic really believe the Catholic Church's teachings and further wish to be charitable to Anglicans, they must ultimately work for the Anglican's coming to the Church. If one wishes to call that war on the Anglican Church, I suppose that might have some merit to the extent that at the end of the day the Pope would very much like the CoE to cease to exist in its present form, namely insofar as it is the Church of England divided against the universal Church. But again, one cannot blame the Catholics subjectively for trying to reach out to their Anglican brothers.

Now Mr. Johnson proceeds to a point that begins to be objective. He argues that the Pope's power needed to be put in check. And as evidence he calls on the condemnation of Jon Hus.

I'm not going to be distracted to clarify the facts of Hus's treatment, nor will I argue the red-herring of Hus's theology; Suffice it to say that Hus was not a mild-mannered priest calling for an end to obvious abuses, but a priest reviving long condemned heresies, and proposing new attacks on central and clear teachings of the Church, who refused to stand down once condemned and made himself sole judge of on matters of the Faith (which is precisely what a heretic is, one who reserves to himself the power to choose).

What is ironic about Mr. Johnson's choice of examples is that Jon Hus was not condemned by a pope, but by a general council called on the authority of the Emperor and which at the time of the trial was acting independently of the pope (recall that this was at the end of the great western schism, and the council in its early acts had a decidedly conciliarist bend). It was only years later that the acts of the council condemning Hus's teaching were ratified by Martin V. The best case, it seems, that Mr. Johnson can find to show that the popes were worldly, power hungry, out of control, and in need of being checked was in fact not an act of a pope at all (not even a papal legate was present).

Now we proceed to Mr Johnson's second historical argument, namely that the Pope was just playing politics in refusing Henry's request for a divorce from Catherine.

Despite the fact that the Pope had accommodated other heads of state, he denied the request

Show me, Mr. Johnson, some evidence that would suggest that there was merit to Henry's case aside from personal or political expedience. The case was quite simple: Henry had wanted to marry Catherine, whom he was--through Church law--prohibited from marrying. Therefore, he asked the Pope to dispense with the impediment. Then after receiving the dispensation, he returned to the pope asking for a declaration of nullity, on the grounds that the pope had no power to make such a dispensation in the first place, and thus the marriage was invalid.

What cases does Mr. Johnson cite when he claims that the pope had granted such claims for other heads of state?

Henry had acknowledged the authority of the pope first in requesting the dispensation, and second in requesting the Holy See to declare its own dispensation illegitimate.

Mr. Johnson's case that the pope should have granted this second request makes no sense theologically unless one denies that there is any supernatural reality or law in Christian marriage, unless one cedes that Christian marriage can and ought to be twisted about however is necessary to accommodate our human goals:

The English monarchy’s need for a male heir was paramount . . . suffice it to say the

purposes of England were different from those of the Pope.

Yes, with this I can agree: Their purposes were quite different. Mr. Johnson does his Church little credit in his simple defense of Henry VIII.

Whereupon Mr. Johnson produces another historical detail of little relevance: the persecutions under Mary. Unlike Henry and Elizabeth's persecutions, Mary's acts are hardly relevant to the question of the legitimacy of the Roman Church, since Mary refused the title of head of the Church.

He goes on to ask some rhetorical questions, none of which really gets to the heart of the question of what is true and right, they are all practical issues that he seems to think will be unpalatable to Anglicans.

Then he returns to the accusation of "sheep stealing":

Don’t we as Anglicans leave such decisions [of conversion] up to the heart of the individual as prompted by God Himself. Yes, I think so.

The pope is also leaving the decision up to the individual. He has merely issued an invitation and extended favorable terms to any Anglican who might wish to swim the Tiber. I've not heard of any forced Anglican conversions resulting from Benedict's acts. In other words, whatever this "sheep stealing" is, the decision's being left to the individual cannot be the real distinctive factor; It is simply disingenuous to suggest that the pope's invitation is anything more than that, an invitation, or that somehow it does not "leave such . . . to the heart of the individual." Or is the invitation truly too good to refuse?

And finally we get some better insight into what constitutes this "sheep stealing":

Though the Anglican Church is open to all, including Catholics, who consider my

invitation to join, we will not emulate the Pope and encourage it.

But what is the distinction between Mr. Johnson's invitation to Catholics and the Pope's invitation to Anglicans, other than the Pope's invitation being rather more accommodating? Is "sheep stealing" just making a better offer than the other side can make?

But he goes on:

As for me, I choose to remain a part of the Anglican Church and practice my faith the way I believe God founded and intended it to serve Him.

So one must ask: Does Mr. Johnson really believe the Anglican Church represents the practice of the faith as it was founded and intended by God to serve Him, or does he not think it right to encourage other people to serve God as He intended to be served?

I'd like to congratulate St. Luke's Episcopal Church in Maryland (whose conversion occasioned Mr. Johnson's letter) on their brave decision to help heal the fractures of Christendom.